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A PRESS CLAUSE RIGHT TO COVER PROTESTS  
Tyler Valeska* 
“Someday, a court may need to decide whether the First Amendment 
protects journalists . . . as distinct from the public generally, from having to 
comply with an otherwise lawful order to disperse from city streets when 
[they] seek to observe, document, and report the conduct of law 




As protests have become more frequent, an increasing number of 
journalists have been targets of harassment and violence. The long-disputed 
role of the First Amendment’s press clause demands attention now more 
than ever. This Article demonstrates how a theoretical framework for a 
revitalized press clause can be operationalized in a particular context: 
journalists covering protests. Valeska first details the normative and 
structural justifications for an affirmative press clause right to cover 
protests. He then considers two proposals for deciding whom the right 
would protect: first, leaving the determination of who is a journalist to 
officers on the protest’s ground level, with the decision being subject to a 
reasonableness standard; second, through a government credentialing 
process. Valeska concludes by summarizing what the right would 
accomplish. He argues for media exemptions from related curfew and 
equipment ordinances, heightened protections against arrest and 
detainment, and special access to spaces cleared by dispersal orders. This 
Article demonstrates that we are in a time of intensifying social unrest and 
that critical prophylactic steps must be taken to shore up protections for one 
of our most important democratic institutions. 
 
*   First Amendment Fellow, Cornell Law School. I appreciate the helpful feedback of Nelson 
Tebbe, Mickey Osterreicher, Cortelyou Kenney, Eli Swiney, and the Academic Professionals Workshop 
at Cornell Law School. Thanks to Alicia Sontag for her research assistance. 
1 Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 4883017, at *3 n.3 
(D. Or. Aug. 20, 2020) (Simon, J.) (opinion and order granting preliminary injunction against federal 
defendants), motion for stay pending appeal denied sub nom Index Newspapers LLC v. United States 
Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2020).  



















There is a long-standing disagreement among scholars, judges, and 
advocates as to the proper role of the Press Clause in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.2 The Supreme Court’s decision a decade ago in Citizens 
United v. FEC reignited this debate. The majority opinion insisted that the 
Court has “consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press 
has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”3 But the 
dissent challenged this assertion,4 and leading scholars have subsequently 
picked up the thread.5 These scholars—most extensively Professor Sonja R. 
West—argue that historical,6 doctrinal,7 and normative8 considerations all 
support special solicitude for those fulfilling the institutional role of the 
press. 
 This article seeks to contribute to that theoretical debate by introducing 
a practical application. I present an empirical model for evaluating the 
viability of affirmative Press Clause protections: journalists covering 
protests. Should the Press Clause be read to provide distinct rights for 
journalists above and beyond those of the general public? What First 
Amendment values would be vindicated by doing so? How would courts go 
about the difficult task of deciding who is or is not a journalist for the 
purposes of Press Clause protection? And what would the right do? I address 
these questions through the prism of the recent Black Lives Matter protests 
and the mistreatment of journalists covering them.  
I proceed in four parts. Part I details why we now need affirmative Press 
 
2.   Compare David Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 
(1983), and C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007), and Melvin Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a 
Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975), and Potter 
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975), with Michael McConnell, Reconsidering 
Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L. J. 412 (2013), and Eugene Volokh, Freedom for 
the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 459 (2012). The former set of articles generally advocates for an interpretation of the Press Clause 
that provides the press, as an institution, with protections meaningfully independent of those afforded 
by the Speech Clause. The latter pair interprets the Press Clause as a corollary of the Speech Clause that 
protects only the right to use mass communications technology to disseminate speech.  
3.   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010). 
4.   Id. at 474 n.75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
5.   See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Favoring the Press, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 91 (2018). 
6.   See, e.g., Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49 (2016). 
7.   See, e.g., Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729 (2014). 


















Clause rights at protests, highlighting the press’s diminished social status, 
law enforcement’s increased hostility toward journalists, and the 
proliferation of protests nationwide. Part II considers the normative 
justifications for such protections, focusing on the structural roles that the 
press plays in our constitutional system and how media coverage of protests 
furthers those roles. Part III examines the definitional question, exploring 
two options for determining who might be entitled to Press Clause 
protections at protests. Part IV concludes by looking at particular 
applications of Press Clause rights: heightened requirements for arrests or 
detainments of journalists at protests, and exemptions from local ordinances 
like curfew orders and police regulations of protest crowds like dispersal 
orders and kettlings.9 By targeting the press and interfering with vital 
newsgathering efforts, law enforcement officers have undercut the 
important constitutional roles fulfilled by the Fourth Estate. The First 




9.   Kettling is a police technique in which large groups of protestors are cordoned off by 
officers and eventually corralled into a small, contained area where they are arrested. See Stephanie 
Sugars, Journalists Covering Protests in US Risk Getting Caught Up in Police Kettling Tactic, COMM. 
TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Mar. 15, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://cpj.org/2018/03/journalists-covering-
protests-in-us-risk-getting-c/ [https://perma.cc/9X6C-L4NL]. 

















I. WHY IS IT NECESSARY? 
 
Protests are “the most dangerous place to be a journalist in America.”10 
The recent Black Lives Matter protests in response to George Floyd’s 
killing are a stark reminder. Journalists across the country were repeatedly 
targeted by police for harassment and violence.11 Journalists of color felt 
particularly threatened, as many were subjected to discriminatory abuses.12 
One press advocate described conditions at the protests as the worst for 
journalists since 1968.13 Others went further: “I’ve really never seen 
anything like this,” lamented one;14 “What we are seeing is an 
unprecedented attack [against] journalists,” decried another.15 In sum, 
 
10.   Jonathan Peters, The Modern Fight for Media Freedom in the United States, 18 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 60, 75 (2020). 
11.   David Folkenflik, As Protests Continue Nationwide, Some Say Police Are Hurting 
Journalists, NPR (June 3, 2020, 5:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/868469744/as-protests-
continue-nationwide-some-say-police-are-hurting-journalists [https://perma.cc/PW3B-ZE88]. Said one 
journalist covering the protests in Minneapolis, Molly Hennessy-Fiske of the LA Times: “Multiple 
officers broke off and came specifically over to us and started shooting at us. They had rubber bullets, 
tear gas. . . . We were not caught in the crossfire. They pursued us. And they knew that we were reporters 
and photographers.” Id.  
12.   See Tracie Potts, Journalists of Color Are Part of the Story of Racism in America. That 
Raises Tough Questions on the Job, UNIV. OF S. CAL. ANNENBERG CTR. FOR HEALTH JOURNALISM 
(June 22, 2020), https://www.centerforhealthjournalism.org/2020/06/19/journalists-color-are-part-
story-racism-america-raises-tough-questions-job [https://perma.cc/5FGU-YZHC]; Xenia Shih Bion, 
Journalists Covering Protests Sabotaged by Police Violence, Harassment, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND. 
(June 15, 2020), https://www.chcf.org/blog/journalists-covering-protests-sabotaged-police-violence-
harassment/ [https://perma.cc/AA86-26BD]; Elahe Izadi & Paul Farhi, ‘The Terror of Wearing Both a 
Press Badge and Black Skin’: Black Journalists Are Carrying Unique Burdens, WASH. POST (June 1, 
2020, 6:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/the-terror-of-wearing-both-a-press-
badge-and-black-skin-black-journalists-are-carrying-unique-burdens-right-now/2020/06/01/2266a258-
a414-11ea-b473-04905b1af82b_story.html [https://perma.cc/6TFW-4JQQ]. 
13.   Kenneth Li, Open Season on the Free Press: Journalists Targeted in Attacks as U.S. 
Protests Rage, REUTERS (May 31, 2020, 6:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-
police-protests-press/open-season-on-the-free-press-journalists-targeted-in-attacks-as-u-s-protests-
rage-idUSKBN2370T5 (quoting Bruce Brown, president of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press). 
14.   Mark Tracy & Rachel Abrams, Police Target Journalists as Trump Blames ‘Lamestream 
Media’ for Protests, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/business/media/reporters-protests-george-floyd.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z23R-U2BP] (quoting Ellen Shearer, professor at the Medill School of Journalism at 
Northwestern University and a co-director of its National Security Journalism Initiative). 
15.   Martin G. Reynolds et al., Covering Unrest: When Journalists of Color Become the 
Target, UNIV. S. CAL. ANNENBERG CTR. FOR HEALTH JOURNALISM (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.centerforhealthjournalism.org/content/covering-unrest-when-journalists-color-become-
target [https://perma.cc/32EC-SNZH] (quote from Carlos Martinez de la Serna, program director for the 


















observers described the summer of 2020 as an “inflection point.”16 
The numbers support that claim. Approximately 1,000 aggressions 
against the press were recorded during the 2020 Black Lives Matter 
protests.17 As of October 29, 2020, that included 220 physical attacks (160 
by law enforcement), 120+ arrests, 102 tear gassings, 67 pepper sprayings, 
202 rubber bullet/projectile hits, 91 equipment damages, and 10 equipment 
searches or seizures.18 These incidents took place across seventy-seven 
American cities and were not confined to major metropolises or certain 
regions.19 They marked a steep acceleration of the years-long deterioration 
of protections for press covering protests.20 Arrests of journalists climbed in 
2020 by over 1200% from 2019.21 In one week spanning the end of May to 
the beginning of June, more reporters were arrested (71) than in the previous 
three years combined.22  
There are reasons to think that the problem will only worsen. One is 
expanded opportunity. Political protests worldwide have become more 
frequent in the last few years. The number of mass protests has increased 
globally by over ten percent annually since 2009.23 Researchers expect this 
trend to continue, projecting that the number and intensity of global protests 
will likely increase in coming years due to slowing global economic growth, 
worsening effects of climate change, and increased foreign interference in 
elections.24  
The United States is no exception. During Donald Trump’s presidency, 
America alone saw over 27,000 protests against the administration, attended 
 
16.   Courtney Douglas, Amid Black Lives Matter Protests, a Crushing Moment for Journalists 
Facing Attacks, Arrests at the Hands of Law Enforcement, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS (Sept. 4, 
2020), https://www.rcfp.org/black-lives-matter-press-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/JG4H-6Y8J]. 
17.   See RTDNA (@RTDNA), TWITTER (Dec. 18, 2020, 1:15 PM),  
https://twitter.com/RTDNA/status/1340012805731344384 (citing U.S. Press Freedom Tracker). 
18.   U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER, https://pressfreedomtracker.us/george-floyd-protests/ 
(last visited September Oct. 29, 2020). This database was established in 2017 and does not house data 
from before its establishment. 
19.   Id. 
20.   See Douglas, supra note 16. 
21.   U.S. PRESS FREEDOM IN CRISIS, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOUNDATION, 4 (2020), 
https://freedom.press/news/2020-report-journalists-arrested-us/?123. 
22.   Id. 
23.   SAMUEL J. BRANNEN, CHRISTIAN S. HAIG & KATHERINE SCHMIDT, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC 
& INTL. STUD., THE AGE OF MASS PROTESTS: UNDERSTANDING AN ESCALATING GLOBAL TREND 1 
(2020), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/200303_MassProtests_V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6KT-TAC4]. 
24.   Id. at Part IV. 

















by 13.6 million protestors.25 Even before the 2020 Black Lives Matter 
protests, these included the five largest demonstrations in U.S. history and 
higher participation (accounting for population growth) than the mass 
movements for Civil Rights and against the Vietnam War.26 But the Black 
Lives Matter protests led a massive uptick. The summer of 2020 alone saw 
over 10,600 demonstrations nationwide, approximately 75% of which were 
linked to the Black Lives Matter movement.27 Media coverage has increased 
correspondingly.28  
Another reason is growing hostility toward the media by the American 
public. A 2019 Gallup poll found that only 41% of Americans had a great 
or fair amount of trust in newspapers, television, and radio to fully, 
accurately, and fairly report the news.29 A 2018 Gallup/Knight Foundation 
survey found that 69% of Americans had lost trust in the news media in the 
preceding decade; only 4% reported an increase in trust.30 And a recent 
Morning Consult analysis found the credibility rating of leading news 
outlets at a new low of only 51.2%, down nearly 10% from December 
2016.31 
Worryingly, our civic institutions are not immune to these trends. For 
example, observers have noted an increased skepticism of media defendants 
by the federal judiciary in recent years, particularly among younger 
judges.32 One obvious culprit for the media’s diminishing public stature is 
 
25.   COUNT LOVE, https://countlove.org/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).  
26.   BRANNEN, HAIG & SCHMIDT, supra note 24 at 1–2. 
27.   ROUDABEH KISHI & SAM JONES, ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT, 
DEMONSTRATIONS & POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: NEW DATA FOR SUMMER 2020 (2020), 
https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/ACLED_USDataReview_Sum2020_SeptWebPDF_HiRes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L2XU-E8TR]. This data tracks the period from May 24-August 22, 2020. 
28.   Michael T. Heaney, The George Floyd Protests Generated More Media Coverage Than 
Any Protest in 50 Years, WASH. POST (July 6, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/06/george-floyd-protests-generated-more-media-
coverage-than-any-protest-50-years/ [https://perma.cc/AEW7-N2RQ]. 
29.   Megan Brenan, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Edges Down to 41%, GALLUP (Sept. 26, 
2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/267047/americans-trust-mass-media-edges-down.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6NU7-79FJ]. 
30.   GALLUP/KNIGHT FOUND., INDICATORS OF NEWS MEDIA TRUST 3 (2018), https://kf-site-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/media_elements/files/000/000/216/original/KnightFoundation_Panel4_
Trust_Indicators_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG8F-Q99Z]. 
31.   Joanna Piacenza, News Media Credibility Rating Falls to a New Low, MORNING 
CONSULT, (Apr. 22, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://morningconsult.com/2020/04/22/media-credibility-cable-
news-poll/ [https://perma.cc/V4TB-BGG9].  


















the previous presidential administration. Trump’s enemy construction of the 
press and the threats it posed are well documented.33 And it does not require 
a leap of logic to connect Trump’s framing of the media as the “enemy of 
the people” with increased police aggressions toward journalist covering 
protests.34 Indeed, reporters, photographers, scholars and press advocates 
have linked the harassment to “an erosion of trust in the news media that [] 
seeped into law enforcement under President Trump.”35 It was easy to see 
why, as Trump explicitly blamed media coverage of the protests for 
intensifying divisions and accused journalists of acting with untoward 
motives: 
The Lamestream Media is doing everything within their 
power to foment hatred and anarchy. As long as everybody 
understands what they are doing, that they are FAKE 
NEWS and truly bad people with a sick agenda, we can 
easily work through them to GREATNESS!36 
But the problem is more deeply rooted than the previous administration. 
As Trump took office, a January 2017 Pew Research survey of officers 
working in departments with 100 or more officers found that 81% already 
thought that the media generally treated police unfairly, with 42% strongly 
agreeing with that sentiment.37 Trump’s vociferous attacks against the 
media on the campaign trail almost certainly contributed to that lack of trust, 
 
(Sept. 23, 2019, 8:20 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/23/legal-defeats-media-first-
amendment-1508565 [https://perma.cc/P8PB-FDPK]. 
33.   See RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. REV. 1301 (2018); see also Sonja R. West, Presidential Attacks on the Press, 83 MO. L. 
REV. 915, 916 (2018). 
34.   A June 2019 poll found that one-third of Americans believed that the media is the “enemy 
of the people.” See Tess Bonn, Poll: One-Third of Americans Say News Media is the ‘Enemy of the 
People,’ THE HILL (July 2, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/451311-poll-a-
third-of-americans-say-news-media-is-the-enemy-of-the-people [https://perma.cc/FZ7D-CFB9]. 
35.   Tracy & Abrams, supra note 14; see also Margaret Sullivan, Trump Has Sown Hatred of 
the Press for Years. Now Journalists are Under Assault from Police and Protestors Alike, WASH. POST 
(May 30, 2020, 6:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/trump-has-sown-hatred-of-
the-press-for-years-now-journalists-are-under-assault-from-police-and-protesters-
alike/2020/05/30/1e6b81ae-a2a3-11ea-81bb-c2f70f01034b_story.html [https://perma.cc/JMJ5-R5DB]. 
36.   Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 31, 2020, 12:36 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1267132763116838913. 
37.   John Gramlich & Kim Parker, Most Officers Say the Media Treat Police Unfairly, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/25/most-officers-say-the-
media-treat-police-unfairly/ [https://perma.cc/JX2Z-NER6]. 

















but likely cannot explain it fully. 
 
II. HOW WOULD IT BE JUSTIFIED? 
 
The Press Clause38 is a dead letter under modern Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. The Court has confined recognition of journalists’ First 
Amendment rights to the Speech Clause, leaving the Press Clause a 
redundancy.39 Unsurprisingly then, the Court has long found no 
constitutional immunity for the press from generally applicable laws.40 In 
Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court famously rejected reporters’ claims that a 
Press Clause privilege exempted them from responding to grand jury 
subpoenas.41 And the Citizens United majority minced no words in denying 
differentiated First Amendment status for media speakers.42 
Yet the arsenal is not empty for advocates of a more muscular Press 
Clause. The Branzburg majority qualified its holding, emphasizing that its 
opinion did not “suggest[] that news gathering does not qualify for First 
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”43 And Justice Powell—who 
delivered the decisive fifth vote—wrote separately to propose a balancing 
test that would weigh the interests of the press against those of the 
government.44 Many lower courts have since recognized constitutional 
newsgathering protections, at least against disclosure of confidential 
sources in certain contexts.45 Some have adopted balancing approaches 
 
38.   “Congress shall make no law abridging . . . the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
39.   See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2011). 
40.   Associated Press. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937). 
41.    408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972). 
42.   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010). 
43.   408 U.S. at 681. The Court later hedged on this language, clarifying that it “in no sense 
implied a constitutional right of access to news sources[,]” meaning that the right to gather news cannot 
be used to compel the government or private parties to supply information. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 
438 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
44.   Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J. concurring). 
45.   Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 
F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), 
opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Farr v. Pitchess, 


















similar to the Powell approach.46 Moreover, a robust lineage of dicta47 and 
favorable treatment48 by the Court suggests a preferred position for the press 
not yet realized under the Press Clause. And some justices have specifically 
advocated for press exemptions from generally applicable laws in situations 
where exemptions were necessary to report on matters of public concern.49 
Taking all this together with the clause’s text,50 a foundation for affirmative 
Press Clause rights emerges. 
The question, then, is why the Press Clause is the necessary vehicle for 
such protections. Why doesn’t the Speech Clause suffice, given the Court’s 
expansive interpretation of it? Or perhaps even enhanced “speech plus” 
rights, as some courts have designated speech implicating other First 
Amendment freedoms (namely religion)?51 The justification for affirmative 
Press Clause rights is rooted in the critical roles that journalists serve in our 
constitutional structure: gathering and disseminating news to the public and 
checking the government.52 Traceable back to the founding,53 these 
functions enhance our democracy by improving deliberative discourse and 
by serving as a bulwark against concentrations of self-interested power.54 
The press is “indispensable to the workings of our democratic society”55 
because it is uniquely situated to fulfill these roles.56  
Thus, the proper framework for understanding special press treatment 
is not the privileging of one speaker vis-à-vis another, but the cultivation of 
 
46.   See, e.g., Auersperg ex rel. von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987); Shoen 
v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993). 
47.   See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 Ga. L. Rev. 705 
(2014). 
48.   See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 383 (1973) 
(“[T]he Court has recognized on several occasions the special institutional needs of a vigorous press by 
striking down laws taxing the advertising revenue of [larger newspapers], requiring a license for the 
distribution of printed matter, and prohibiting the door-to-door distribution of leaflets.”) (citations 
omitted).  
49.   See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 677 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
50 For an argument as to why separate clauses for the freedom of speech and the freedom of the 
press implies separate panoplies of rights, see Nimmer, supra note 2.  
51.   See, e.g., Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2020).  
52.   West, supra note 7, at 749–55. 
53.   Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1102 
(2016) (“[T]here can be no serious doubt that the institutional function of freedom of the press has always 
been understood to be to preserve democracy and check government tyranny.” (emphasis omitted)).  
54.   West, supra note 5, at 94. 
55.   Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
56.   See West, supra note 5, at 94. 

















a healthy system of free expression that better protects all speakers’ rights 
vis-à-vis the government.57 The harm in failing to recognize affirmative 
Press Clause rights “comes from our failure to recognize the unique 
constitutional interest we all share in the protection of the press’s public-
serving functions.”58 This interest is categorically distinct from the liberty 
interests of individual expression served by the Speech Clause.59 
Recognition of that distinction is thus recognition of the special structural 
significance that press functions serve in our democracy. 
Such recognition is also a practical necessity in many cases. Indeed, the 
very need for a Press Clause right to cover protests hinges on the 
impracticability of allowing, for example, all members of the public to 
remain behind police lines following a dispersal order.60 Whereas the 
Speech Clause’s protections are guided by an equality principle—“the 
essential postulate that all persons within public discourse should be equally 
free to say or not say what they choose” 61— the Press Clause’s protections 
ought be reserved for the “category of cases where it might not make sense 
to recognize a particular First Amendment right for all speakers, yet where 
our failure to recognize the right for the press harms our collective interest 
in a well-informed populace and a monitored government.”62 As explained 
below, protest coverage falls squarely within this category. 
  
 
57.   Id. at 94–95. 
58.   Sonja R. West, The Majoritarian Press Clause, 2020, 13 UNIV. OF CHICAGO LEGAL 
FORUM, 311, 322 (2020). 
59.   Id. 
60.   See infra Part IV.B.2. 
61.   See ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, & ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE, 22 (2012).  
62.   West, supra note 59, at 322. It is for this basic reason that the right-of-access framework 
applied by the majority in the Index Newspapers case discussed infra is ill-suited to the problem of press 
exemptions from dispersal orders. See Index Newspapers LLC v. United States Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 
817, 835 (9th Cir. 2020). As the dissent notes, the right of access applies equally to everyone—it thus 
cannot sustain the necessary differential treatment for journalists required by chaotic situations such as 


















A. Information Dissemination 
  
The press’s first function in our democratic system is informational. 
Modern First Amendment theory draws heavily on the notion that effective 
self-government requires an open exchange of ideas and a free flow of 
information.63 The basic idea is that political decision making—the act of 
forming common judgments—is contingent upon shared knowledge and 
opinions that have been collectively considered, debated, and tested.64 This 
discursive decision-making process improves outcomes by fostering 
“democratic competence.”65 A related but distinct aspect of the 
informational function relates to individual autonomy. Under an autonomy 
theory, government is only legitimate if it allows citizens to express 
themselves, regardless of whether that expression leads to better democratic 
outcomes.66 Government must not unduly impede the dissemination of news 
and ideas that serve as prerequisites for meaningful expression.67  
Empirical studies demonstrate how protest journalism performs the 
informative function by promoting “the cognitive empowerment of persons 
within public discourse.”68 Most protests worldwide fail to capture 
widespread attention; those that succeed do so via the press.69 Journalists 
convey to citizens the knowledge needed to form and express opinions 
about protests and their underlying issues.70 This proliferation of informed 
opinions propels shared decision making. A rough proxy for how protest 
coverage enriches democratic competence is the extent to which it drives 
legislative response. Protests have minimal direct impact on policy.71 But 
 
63.   See generally ALEXANDER MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960). 
64.   Id. 
65.   See Steve Vladeck, Democratic Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and the Freedom 
of the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 529, 540 (2012). 
66.   Andrea Butler, Protecting the Democratic Role of the Press: A Legal Solution to Fake 
News, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 419, 426 (2018). 
67.   See id. at 425–26. 
68.   See POST, supra note 62 at 34.  
69.   See William A. Gamson & Gadi Wolfsfeld, Movements and Media as Interacting Systems, 
528 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SCI. 114, 116 (1993) (describing protests “with no media coverage at 
all” as “nonevents”); see also Ruud Koopmans & Susan Olzak, Discursive Opportunities and the 
Evolution of Right-Wing Violence in Germany, 110 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 198, 224 (2004).  
70.   See Ruud Koopmans, Movements and Media: Selection Processes and Evolutionary 
Dynamics in the Public Sphere, 33 THEORY & SOC’Y 367, 379 (2004). 
71.   MARCO GIUGNI, SOCIAL PROTEST AND POLICY CHANGE: ECOLOGY, ANTINUCLEAR, AND 
PEACE MOVEMENTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 144 (2004). 

















news coverage of protests increases general media attention on the 
underlying issues, sparking broader societal conversations which in turn 
lead to increased legislative activity on those issues.72 The press thus serves 
as an informational intermediary, facilitating dialogues among citizens and 
between constituents and representatives.73  
 
B. Checking Governmental Behavior 
 
Media coverage of protests also serves the checking function, “the 
paradigm First Amendment activity.”74 Justice Stewart described checking 
as the Press Clause’s “primary purpose,” designed “to create a fourth 
institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three 
official branches.”75 The Supreme Court has explained that this function 
derives from the realities of quotidian life: because the average citizen has 
limited time and resources to devote to observing her government, it is 
incumbent upon journalists to do so, and to synthesize their observations 
into easily digestible news reports.76 In other words, the press keeps the 
government honest by keeping the people apprised.77 The First Amendment 
recognizes the structural significance of the press’s watchdog role.78 
Media coverage of protests fulfills this role in self-evident ways. One 
example is the neutral monitoring of how law enforcement uses its 
regulatory authority to control protests. As federal district court judge 
Michael Simon recently explained: 
[T]he point of journalists observing and documenting 
government action is to record whether the “closing” of 
public streets (e.g., declaring a riot) is lawfully originated 
and carried out. Without journalists . . . there is only the 
government’s side of the story to explain why a “riot” was 
 
72.   Rens Vliegenthart et al., The Media as Dual Mediator of the Political Agenda-Setting 
Effect of Protest. A Longitudinal Study in Six Western European Countries, 95 SOC. FORCES 837, 854 
(2016). 
73.   See Butler, supra note 73, at 424. 
74.   See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. BAR FOUND. 
RSCH. J. 521, 609 (1977). 
75.   Stewart, supra note 2, at 634. 
76.   Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975). 
77.   See Bhagowat, supra note 54. 


















declared and the public streets were “closed” and whether 
law enforcement acted properly in effectuating that order.79 
Effectuation gets at another way protest journalism checks government: 
cataloging the use of force against protestors. Such cataloging checks law 
enforcement behavior by disincentivizing violent measures. Recent 
experience might cause one to question this proposition, as cops around the 
country repeatedly engaged in aggressive crowd control tactics against 
protestors and journalists, seemingly undeterred by rolling cameras.80 But 
empirical evidence supports an inverse correlation between media attention 
on protests and repressive police measures.81 Put another way, press 
coverage of protests leads to less violence by law enforcement against 
protestors.82 
 
C. What a Press Clause Right to Cover Protests Accomplishes 
 
Media coverage of protests fulfills the dual functions underlying the 
press’s pivotal role in our constitutional structure. But this is so only when 
journalists are able to adequately observe and record police behavior at 
protests.83 Additional protections are needed to ensure that three basic 
requirements are met. First, journalists must have access to protests. This 
becomes an issue if, for example, curfew orders do not include media 
exemptions for late night demonstrations, precluding coverage of those 
demonstrations altogether.84  
Second, journalists must be able to effectively engage in newsgathering. 
One relevant problem is the hectic nature of protests, which can prevent 
media members from effectively viewing and documenting law 
enforcement responses. Special access for journalists is justified “at least in 
 
79.   Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 4220820, at 
*6 (D. Or. July 23, 2020) (Simon, J.) (order granting temporary restraining order enjoining federal 
defendants).  
80.   KISHI & JONES, supra note 28, at 7. Nine percent of 2020 Black Lives Matter protests were 
met with government intervention, and fifty-four percent of those interventions involved the use of force. 
Id. Both numbers represent dramatic increases from recent years. Id. 
81.   Dominique Wisler & Marco Giugni, Under the Spotlight: The Impact of Media Attention 
on Police Protesting, 4 MOBILIZATION 171, 183 (1999). 
82.   Id. 
83.   See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment, 93 IND. 
L.J. 267, 270 (2018). 
84.   See infra Part IV. 

















contexts where disruption, overcrowding, and chaos require a winnowing 
of potential information receivers.”85 A related issue is that journalists are 
sometimes obstructed in the type of equipment or tools they can use in their 
newsgathering.86  
Third, journalists must not be driven to cease newsgathering or leave 
protests altogether. One issue on this front is detainments and arrests, as 
were seen en masse last summer.87 Even brief detainments hinder 
newsgathering efforts. More troubling is the problem of law enforcement 
aggression—whether incidentally or intentionally directed at media—
inhibiting coverage. When journalists are subjected to ferocious crowd 
control measures such as projectiles, tear gas, and physical force, they are 
forced to stop newsgathering for extended periods of time.88 Sometimes 
they are unable to continue covering protests because of injuries inflicted 
by police.89 Some have reported leaving protest assignments and refusing to 
go back after being targeted for harassment by police.90 Protections are thus 
necessary to ensure that press are not dissuaded from performing the vital 
functions laid out above.  
One might question whether the First Amendment is the proper source 
of special newsgathering protections. Consider Justice Burger’s objection 
in Houchins v. KQED that asking courts to grant such protections 
constitutionally is inherently flawed “because it invites the Court to involve 
itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to 
the political processes.”91 Some commentators have echoed concerns of 
institutional competency.92  
But politically fraught issues surrounding policing, protests, and press 
coverage are not conducive to robust legislative responses bolstering press 
protections. Recent experience shows why. Protest activity is spiking while 
 
85.   See West, supra note 5 at 131. 
86.   See infra Part IV. 
87.   Supra Part I. 
88.   Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 4883017, at 
*16 (D. Or. Aug. 20, 2020) (Simon, J.) (opinion and order granting preliminary injunction against federal 
defendants). 
89.   Id. 
90.   Id. 
91.   Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
92.   See Vladeck, supra note 72, at 545–46; Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections 
on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 564–65 (1979); Stewart, supra 


















conditions for journalists covering protests are simultaneously 
deteriorating.93 Yet many states have introduced legislation in recent years 
directly targeting protests rather than enhancing protections for protestors 
and journalists.94 Only California has even attempted a legislative solution 
in the wake of the Black Lives Matter protests to shore up journalists’ ability 
to gather news at demonstrations without interference, and that legislation 
was vetoed by Governor Gavin Newsome.95  
It is thus unsurprising that the United States ranks only 45th out of 180 
countries in Reporters Without Borders’ 2020 World Press Freedom 
Index.96 And, if anything, the political influence of media is waning, as the 
industry’s finances and public support have plummeted in recent decades to 
a degree that leaves legislative recourse unlikely in many states.97 If media 
is unable to protect its vital structural role in our constitutional system via 
the democratic process, the First Amendment is the failsafe.98 These grim 
circumstances make the case for affirmative Press Clause rights “especially 
compelling of late.”99  
The rights of the press are not the only interests at stake. Refusal to 
protect newsgathering imposes systemic harms that diminish the speech 
environment for everyone.100 Treating the press no differently than other 
speakers even when differential treatment is journalistically necessary thus 
leaves everyone worse off.101 Because protests present uniquely chaotic 
environments in which widespread access is often impractical, journalists 
must be accommodated as the only surrogates for a watchful public.102 
 
93.   Supra Part I. 
94.   See NORA BENAVIDEZ & JAMES TAGER, PEN AMERICA, ARRESTING DISSENT: 
LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PROTEST 16 (2020), https://pen.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/Arresting-Dissent-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA99-H97G]. 
95.   See S.B. 629, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). The bill is discussed in more detail in 
Parts III and IV. 
96.   Ranking 2020, RSF: REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/ranking 
[https://perma.cc/K2LU-U2TB]. 
97.   See Christina Koningisor, The De Facto Reporter’s Privilege, 127 YALE L.J. 1176, 1265 
(2018). 
98.   Lyrissa Lidsky, After the Golden Age: The Fragility of the Fourth Estate, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Aug. 21, 2020, 5:15 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2020/08/after-the-golden-age-
the-fragility-of-the-fourth-estate.html [https://perma.cc/SKC5-LUNS]. 
99.   Erin Carroll, Promoting Journalism as Method, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 691, 706 (2020). 
100.  See West, supra note 8, at 2447.  
101.  Id. 
102.  RonNell Andersen Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners, 
90 U. COLO. L. REV. 499, 549 (2019). 

















Giving journalists special legal protections enables them to do this 
important job. Their contribution to system of free expression—the ways in 
which they enhance the speech environment for everyone—justifies 
differential treatment.103 
 
III. WHOM WOULD IT COVER? 
 
Judicial recognition of a Press Clause right to cover protests would 
necessitate a determination as to whom that right would apply and a system 
for implementing that determination in practice. The definitional question—
who counts as “the press” for the purposes of discrete Press Clause rights—
has been deemed “intractable” by many courts and commentators.104 The 
Supreme Court has balked at an answer, declining to read into the First 
Amendment special protections for a select group of speakers identified as 
“the press” precisely because that group’s boundaries are historically and 
philosophically malleable.105 As many scholars have noted, this has created 
a paradox of over-inclusivity: when effectively everyone is considered “the 
press,” no one can be singled out for special protections.106  
There is ample theoretical support in the literature for rejecting an all-
encompassing definition that dilutes any protections the Press Clause might 
provide.107 Government actors regularly define the press for various 
purposes across many contexts.108 Among advocates for an exclusive Press 
Clause, there is a general consensus that a functional test is the best method 
 
103.  Id. 
104.  See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS 
FOR A NEW CENTURY 53 (2010). 
105.  See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972): 
The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would present 
practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be 
necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, 
a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press 
is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph 
just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest 
photocomposition methods. 
106.  See STEPHEN GILLERS, JOURNALISM UNDER FIRE 51 (2018); Sonja West, The Problem 
with Free Press Absolutism, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 191, 199 (2016). 
107.  See West, supra note 113, at 199; see also Randall P. Bezanson, Whither Freedom of the 
Press?, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1271 (2012). 
108.  See West, supra note 40, at 1062–68 (listing examples including, inter alia, shield laws, 


















for determining who receives Press Clause protection.109 A functional test 
generally considers various factors and can broadly be stated as: whether a 
newsgatherer regularly engages in the dissemination of information on 
matters of public concern in accordance with some combination of 
independent editorial judgment, standards, and training or education.110 This 
holistic approach minimizes definitional difficulties by allowing courts to 
“apply constitutional principles via an organizational process that unfolds 
over time.”111 One version is utilized in the federal Freedom of Information 
Act, which defines the news media for the purposes of fee exemptions.112  
 A functional test helps head off one important objection that some 
newsgatherers at the margins might be unfairly excluded. This objection is 
especially salient when cast as an equitable criticism that a tiered system of 
protections inevitably works to the advantage of entrenched institutions. 
Line drawing is an inevitable consequence of affording Press Clause 
protections, and some independent newsgatherers might well be left out in 
any given scenario. But a functional approach helps alleviate these concerns 
to a significant degree. By granting special protections to anyone covering 
protests who fulfills the role of the press—regardless of whether they work 
for The Washington Post or run a nonprofit watchdog blog out of their living 
room—the functional test mitigates the extent to which an exclusive Press 
Clause might unduly favor legacy media over citizen journalists.113  
Other First Amendment rights provide an additional backstop. All 
speakers enjoy the protections of a robust Speech Clause doctrine.114 And 
 
109.  See West, supra note 8, at 2454 (“Focusing on the functional roles is both constitutionally 
based and allows for standards to adapt over time.”); see also GILLERS, supra note 113, at 64–65; 
Bezanson, supra note 114, at 1271. 
110.  See West, supra note 8, at 2454; see also GILLERS, supra note 113, at 64–65; Bezanson, 
supra note 114, at 1271. Note that this is a rough, non-exhaustive amalgamation of the cited scholars’ 
proposed functional tests. Which criteria should be included, excluded, prioritized, and/or deemphasized 
is outside the scope of this Article.  
111.  West, supra note 8, at 2453. 
112.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(ii)(II) (defining “representative of the news media” as “any person 
or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills 
to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience.”). 
113.  See id. (noting that “as methods of news delivery evolve (for example, the adoption of the 
electronic dissemination of newspapers through telecommunication services), such alternative media 
shall be considered to be news-media entities.”). 
114.  See West, supra note 40, at 1058 (“A narrow definition of the press is not as 
constitutionally problematic as might first appear because all individuals and entities have extensive 
communicative rights under the Speech Clause. In other words, our broad free speech rights for everyone 
justify a narrow regime for the press.”).  

















the right to attend “demonstrations, protest marches, and picketing” is 
hallowed.115 Many of these protections allow any protest attendee 
(journalist or not) to engage in some basic forms of newsgathering. Consider 
the widespread recognition of a constitutional right to record. Every federal 
court of appeals to decide the issue has found a First Amendment right for 
all speakers to record police activity.116  
Moreover, Speech Clause protections “appl[y] with particular force” to 
expressive activity at protests.117 First Amendment restrictions placed on 
city streets and sidewalks are “subject to a particularly high degree of 
scrutiny.”118 Courts have found that governments must satisfy strict scrutiny 
for a litany of infringements of protest attendees’ Speech Clause rights,119 
such as blanket searches of attendees,120 restricting expressive activity in 
certain areas,121 and removal of attendees.122 Beyond these expansive 
Speech Clause protections, the rights of association and assembly might 
serve as additional shields, although like the Press Clause the Assembly 
Clause’s protections are underdeveloped in modern jurisprudence.123  
With this high baseline of strong protections for all individuals 
attending protests, the detrimental impact of exclusionary Press Clause 
rulings in some borderline cases is dampened. Most cases will be easy.124 
 
115.  See Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1996). 
116.  See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011); Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 
F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017); Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU of 
Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608–09 (7th Cir. 2012); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 442 (9th 
Cir. 1995); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). New York recently 
codified similar protections. See NYS Civil Rights Section 79-P (eff. July 2020), available at 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CVR/79-P. 
117.  See Seattle Affiliate of Oct. 22nd Coal. to Stop Police Brutality, Repression & 
Criminalization of a Generation v. City of Seattle, 550 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
118.   Black Lives Matter Seattle-King Cnty. v. City of Seattle, No. 2:20-CV-00887-RAJ, 2020 
WL 3128299, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2020); Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting NAACP W. Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1355 (1984)). 
119.  See INST. FOR CONST. ADVOC. & PROT., PROTESTS AND PUBLIC SAFETY: A GUIDE FOR 
CITIES AND CITIZENS 8 (2020), https://constitutionalprotestguide.org/ICAP-Protest_and_Public_Safety-
Toolkit-072720.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WAY-YNB6]. 
120.  Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1320 (11th Cir. 2004). 
121.  Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 749 (6th Cir. 1999). 
122.  Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., 805 F.3d 228, 247 (6th Cir. 2015). 
123.  See generally Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
543 (2009). 
124.  See Abrams, supra note 99, at 580 (“In the great preponderance of cases, a court has little 


















The low costs and high rewards thus counsel in favor of recognition. There 
are two options for implementation that warrant consideration: an officer 
discretion standard and a centralized credentialing process. Each is 
considered in turn. 
 
A. Officer Discretion, Subject to a Reasonableness Standard  
 
The first approach leaves the determination of who is a journalist to 
officers on the ground at protests. Such determinations would be subject to 
a reasonableness standard. A federal district court in Portland, OR recently 
adopted a version of this approach. In Index Newspapers, LLC v. City of 
Portland, Judge Simon enjoined adverse law enforcement actions against 
“any person whom [officers] know or reasonably should know is a 
Journalist.”125 Judge Simon provided criteria for who should reasonably be 
considered a journalist, including anyone wearing “visual identification as 
a member of the press, such as by carrying a professional or authorized press 
pass or wearing a professional or authorized press badge or other official 
press credentials or distinctive clothing that identifies the wearer as a 
member of the press.”126 Judge Simon also noted that “standing off to the 
side of a protest, not engaging in protest activities, and not intermix[ing] 
with persons engaged in protest activities” are additional indicia, although 
not requirements.127 He added that the enumerated indicia were “not 
exclusive, and a person need not exhibit every indicium to be considered a 
Journalist.”128 Officers would not be liable under the order for unintentional 
violations against attendees not displaying visible indicia.129 The Ninth 
 
125.  No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 4883017, at *27–*29 (D. Or. Aug. 20, 2020) (Simon, J.) 
(opinion and order granting preliminary injunction against federal defendants). Although the court relied 
upon the First Amendment right of access—an inclusive right belonging equally to the press and the 
public—the effect of the ruling is to grant additional privileges to journalists (and legal observers). The 
approach is thus a useful model for how a Press Clause right might be applied in the same way in the 
same context. The Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending full consideration on the merits. Order at 
2, Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2020). Upon 
President Biden’s inauguration, the new administration requested that the case be held in abeyance, 
which the court granted on February 12, 2021. Id. at Docket No. 74. 
126.  Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 4883017, at 
*27–*29 (D. Or. Aug. 20, 2020) (Simon, J.) (opinion and order granting preliminary injunction against 
federal defendants). 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. Although the captioned defendant is the City of Portland, the Department of Homeland 

















Circuit sanctioned this approach.130  
The California legislature adopted a similar but somewhat more limited 
approach in SB 629 (which, as noted above, was ultimately vetoed by 
Governor Newsome). The bill afforded heightened protections to anyone at 
protests “who appears to be engaged in gathering, receiving, or processing 
information, who produces a business card, press badge, other similar 
credential, or who is carrying a professional broadcasting or recording 
equipment.”131 
These approaches are laudably inclusive, allowing for both official and 
unofficial indicia to suffice in determining who should reasonably be 
considered a journalist. The fact that Judge Simon’s enumerated indicia are 
non-exclusive is significant: the test should provide coverage to all who 
exhibit clear signs of engaging in the function of newsgathering, including 
those carrying journalistic equipment, or those who can produce 
documentation or other evidence of past journalistic work and an 
assignment to cover the present protest.132 It should be broad enough to 
include, for example, an undercover freelance journalist carrying a notepad 
and recording on her phone, who is able to show officers previous stories 
she’s published (such as by pulling articles up on a web browser) and 
documentation showing that she is on assignment at the protest (such as 
emails confirming the assignment from an editor at a media organization).133 
Examples of past work plus evidence of reporting activity (taking 
notes/videos/and pictures) should generally suffice.134  
But the test would not cover someone like John Sullivan, the subject of 
a recent profile in The New Yorker.135 Sullivan was arrested for participating 
 
Security was added as a defendant after the Trump administration directed federal troops to guard the 
federal courthouse in Portland against potential property damage resulting from the protests. The 
preliminary injunction cited here applies to the federal defendants, although an earlier order with similar 
terms was entered against the local defendants.  
130.  See Index Newspapers LLC v. United States Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 835 (9th Cir. 
2020). 
131.  S.B. 629, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). 
132.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(ii) (“A freelance journalist shall be regarded as working for a 
news-media entity if the journalist can demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication through that 
entity, whether or not the journalist is actually employed by the entity.”). 
133.  Id. (“A publication contract would present a solid basis for such an expectation.”). 
134.  Id. (“[T]he Government may also consider the past publication record of the requester in 
making such a determination.”). 
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in the January 6, 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol.136 He defended his 
presence as a forceful entrant by claiming he was there as a journalist: “I 
was not there to be a participant. I was there to record,” he claimed.137 He 
pointed to his attendance at previous protests in a quasi-journalistic 
capacity.138 Moreover, the footage he captured inside the Capitol was 
immensely valuable as evidence, as an artifact of what transpired, and as 
commercial news footage for which he was paid over $70,000 by CNN and 
NBC.139  
Nonetheless, Sullivan would fail the reasonableness test because he was 
unquestionably an active member of the riot. He captured himself on camera 
repeatedly asserting as much, proclaiming after breaching the Capitol 
terrace, “[t]his shit’s ours! We accomplished this shit. We did this shit 
together! Fuck, yeah!”140 He also repeatedly claimed to have a knife, 
instructed a Capitol police officer to leave the scene so as not to get hurt, 
encouraged other rioters to push through security lines, and repeatedly 
suggested arson.141 No reasonable standard would extend protection to 
someone so plainly engaged in violent criminal behavior, notwithstanding 
the journalistic value of any concurrent newsgathering efforts. 
Even excluding those engaged in criminal violence, one downside of 
inclusivity is that it exposes the approach to manipulation. This is most 
readily apparent with self-styled identifiers such as homemade labeling on 
clothes. As scholars have noted, incentives for abuse emerge where merely 
self-identifying as the press can entitle one to preferential treatment.142 In 
fact, the government alleged that exactly this problem arose in response to 
the Index Newspapers temporary restraining order in Portland. A few 
protestors and purported vandals masqueraded as members of the press by 
emblazoning PRESS lettering on their clothes to circumvent dispersal 
 
rioting [https://perma.cc/4JJZ-B4DT]. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
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orders and officer scrutiny.143 Imposters of this sort highlight how affording 
protections on the basis of self-labeling alone strays away from the goals 
underlying the functional test. Anyone at a protest can tape PRESS on their 
shirt, regardless of whether they seek to check police misconduct by 
informing the public of how officers are treating protestors. The more 
restrictive SB 629 approach heads off some of these concerns, but at the 
price of inclusivity.  
An objection to either approach might be that such an assessment would 
be onerous on officers, particularly in a chaotic, potentially hostile 
environment. But experts have testified that “trained and experienced law 
enforcement personnel can differentiate press from protestors in the heat of 
crowd control.”144 Sufficient training by police departments should further 
enable officers to make these determinations on the scene. Again, the 
majority of the journalists covering protests will be easily and immediately 
identifiable as such.  
The benefit of this approach is that it is, at least in theory, favorable to 
journalists. A reasonableness test encourages officers to take a wide latitude 
in making determinations. And it eases the newsgathering burden on 
journalists. After all, journalists usually wear clear visible demarcations of 
press status such as lettering on clothes, vests, or helmets and will generally 
have professional equipment or similar indices of newsgathering activity. A 
reasonableness approach should afford them protection simply by showing 
up and doing their jobs. 
  
 
143.  Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 4883017, at 
*12 (D. Or. Aug. 20, 2020) (opinion and order granting preliminary injunction against federal 
defendants). Note, however, that the government pointed to only a handful of purported examples of 
press impersonation, and upon review of the submitted videos the Court found “persuasive evidence” of 
only two such instances. Id.  


















B. Governmental Credentialing  
 
If an officer discretion approach is deemed unworkable, the most 
feasible alternative would be to only recognize protection for individuals 
bearing government-issued credentials to cover protests. Some metropolitan 
police departments already grant official press passes to journalists who 
routinely cover breaking city news, and there are plausible benefits to this 
approach.145 A credential application process would remove concerns about 
chaotic, on-the-spot determinations. Formal passes could help officers 
working protests make quick and easy assessments as to who is entitled to 
Press Clause protections. In addition to having more time to review 
applications than on-the-job officers, a credentialing body may have a 
deeper subject matter knowledge of what indicia should be relevant to a 
functional test. A centralized system might be more likely to produce 
consistent, uniform determinations than an ad hoc network of individual 
decision makers. And requiring journalists to apply beforehand allows time 
for an appeals process to play out in the event of an adverse determination. 
But this option also suffers from several comparative defects relative to 
an officer discretion approach. It is an extra hoop (and a potentially 
burdensome one) for journalists to jump through. This extra work 
entrenches the advantage of institutional media, who generally have the 
knowledge, resources, and reputation that make it easier to navigate such 
processes. This is compounded by complaints that credentials are denied 
with disproportionate frequency to smaller, community-based, and/or 
ethnic-focused publications.146  
Another issue is one of timing: protests often spring up unannounced, 
forming rapidly in response to unforeseen events. This compresses the 
amount of time available to apply for credentials. It also leaves applicants 
subject to the capacity constraints (or worse) of credentialing 
organizations—during recent protests in New York City, the police 
 
145.  See, e.g., L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
https://www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/2026#:~:text=A%20one%20time%20
%2416.00%20fee,and%20issued%20a%20Media%20Pass [https://perma.cc/3QMU-P4G6].  
146.  See, e.g., Comptroller Stringer Calls on Mayor de Blasio to Transfer Press Credentials 
Away from NYPD and Create New Application Standards that Reflect the Diversity of New York City 





















department entirely ceased issuing new press credentials to any 
applicants.147 These hurdles might exclude journalists who get an 
unexpected assignment or make a spontaneous decision to cover a protest. 
There are also concerns regarding responsibility for issuing credentials. 
Given that media coverage of protests sometimes focuses on the police 
response (and sometimes casts that response in a negative light), there are 
clear conflicts of interest if police departments or even city officials are 
given unfettered discretion to award credentials. While decisions to deny 
credentials would be subject to Press Clause constraints (and thus to judicial 
review), it is easy to envision officials slow-rolling or denying applications 
for media deemed hostile to police. Indeed, such criticisms were recently 
levied in New York City148 and against the Trump administration, which 
revoked certain reporters’ White House press passes in arbitrary ways that 
suggested political motives.149 If such a system is required, credentialing 
should be done by an independent board or agency not directly accountable 
to police or related political officials.150 The New York City Comptroller 
recently proposed that credentialing authority be transferred from the police 
to the Office of the Mayor.151 City Council subsequently introduced 
legislation that would transfer the authority to  the Department of Citywide 
Administrative Services.152 It’s unclear how an independent credentialing 
process might work outside of major cities, where local resources are 
typically less plentiful. 
Of course, the primary benefit of credentialing is that, in theory, it 
facilitates on-the-ground determinations made in real time by officers 
 
147.  Id. 
148.  See Michael Gartland, NYC Journalists, Media Orgs, and Politicians Demand Changes 
to NYPD Supervision of Press Credentials, NY DAILY NEWS (Aug. 17, 2020, 5:43 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-press-credentials-press-pass-siegel-nigro-stringer-
brewer-20200817-lnmwvdrd7jg4pdydxyjx4niryi-story.html [https://perma.cc/EQJ4-NGDR]. 
149.  See, e.g., Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
150.  One option that would likely not work can be drawn from the suggestion Judge Simon 
made during a hearing in the Portland case: allowing the ACLU to determine who is a journalist for the 
purposes of determining protest protections. See Karina Brown, Judge Proposes ACLU Define Who is a 
Journalist at Portland Protests, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 31, 2020), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/whos-a-journalist-in-portland-judge-says-aclu-might-decide/ 
[https://perma.cc/EVB9-2H9H]. Such a determination would have to be made by the government. It is 
axiomatic that a private party cannot confer constitutional authority to another private party. 
151.  N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, supra note 153. 




















working protests: either someone has a credential, or they don’t. But this 
rationale is undercut if identifying credentials is difficult in protest 
conditions. In the Index Newspapers case, the government argued that, 
“under the chaotic circumstances of the protests, it is difficult for the 
officers, who are often wearing gas masks and laser protective goggles, to 
verify small indicia of press membership that may be present on certain 
members of crowds. It is particularly difficult for officers to make these 
determinations while remaining a safe distance away from crowds to 
employ crowd control devices in a manner that is safe for both the crowd 
and the officers.”153 The government also raised the specter of forged 
credentials.154 The potential for abuse goes both ways: numerous journalists 
in New York City reported that they faced threats of confiscation of their 
credentials by officers while covering recent protests.155 These practical 
problems suggest that formal credentials would not alleviate many of the 
ease-of-determination issues that the reasonableness test supposedly 
engenders.  
Neither option is a perfect solution. The flaws of each might hamper a 
fulsome implementation of a functional test, perhaps in ways that disfavor 
citizen journalists. Notwithstanding the drawbacks of each approach, 
however, it is clear that both options would afford significant new benefits 
to large swaths of journalists. Taking into consideration the Speech Clause’s 
fallback protections outlined above, it is evident that an imperfect 
definitional regime that affords additional protections above and beyond 
what journalists presently enjoy is preferable to the status quo. 
  
 
153.  Motion, Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 
4883017 at 6. 
154.  Id. at 9. 
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IV. WHAT WOULD IT DO? 
 
A. Local Protest Regulations  
 
Cities nationwide issued a variety of ordinances regulating the 2020 
Black Lives Matter protests.156 For example, Las Vegas instituted a 
prohibition on items of a certain size (including backpacks, laptop bags, and 
camera bags) but excepted essential media equipment.157 In the past, cities 
have enacted similar equipment prohibitions without such an exception.158 
Included in these prohibitions were gas masks, “sticks, poles, ladders, 
monopods, bipods, and tripods.”159  
More prominently, nearly 150 cities instituted curfew orders in response 
to the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests.160 Media are usually exempted 
from these orders.161 But a few cities—including Atlanta, GA; Cleveland, 
OH;  Fort Lauderdale, FL; and Kenosha, WI—failed to include such 
exemptions.162 After significant backlash from media entities and 
advocates, these cities eventually added a media exemption.163 Nonetheless, 
several journalists nationwide were charged with breaking city curfews.164 
 
156.  See, e.g., Brett McGinness, Las Vegas Protests: City Council Bans Large Bags, Strollers, 
Carts at Protests, RENO GAZETTE J. (June 3, 2020, 1:24 PM), 
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2020/06/03/las-vegas-protests-clark-county-consider-ban-bags-other-
items-protests/3134465001/ [https://perma.cc/JQ7R-KLNY]. 
157.  Las Vegas, Nev., An Emergency Ordinance Relating to Demonstrations, Rallies, Protests, 
and Similar Events; Temporarily Adding to the List of Items Already Prohibited at Those Events a 
Number of Containers of a Certain Type and Size and Certain Wheeled Vehicles or Devices, and 
Providing for Other Related Matters, Bill No. E-2020-1 (June 3, 2020), 
https://files.lasvegasnevada.gov/council/Bill-No.E-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/57ND-B5GH]. 
158.  Mickey Osterreicher, Practical Advice About Covering High Profile News Stories During 
Protests and Upcoming Elections, NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N (July 16, 2020), 
https://nppa.org/news/practical-advice-about-covering-high-profile-news-stories 
[https://perma.cc/JQ9R-88FU] (citing Tampa and Charlotte in 2012 and Philadelphia and Cleveland in 
2016). 
159.  Id. 
160.  Protest Curfew Order Tracker, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS (June 2, 2020), 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1dVQ_pm9U5fxD_KT43D9Xy3xOZSA7NeM8FUIGwPwjN0
o/edit#gid=0 [https://perma.cc/DFT2-8GL9]. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Jim Kuhnhenn, Curfew Orders Add to Potential Tension Between Journalists and Police, 
NAT’L PRESS CLUB JOURNALISM INST. (June 2, 2020), https://www.pressclubinstitute.org/curfew-
orders-add-to-potential-tension-between-journalists-and-police/ [https://perma.cc/67UK-VDFR]. 
164.  Charges Remain Against Journalists Arrested During George Floyd Protests, COMM. TO 


















The constitutionality of exemption-less curfew orders has not been 
litigated.165  
A Press Clause right to cover protests would mandate media exemptions 
from curfew and equipment ordinances. Such exemptions are consistent 
with the values the Press Clause should be construed to vindicate. The 
dissemination of news to the public and the checking function on the 
government are both served when the press is allowed to use essential 
equipment and document late night assemblies, which are often less 
peaceful and more contentious than protests taking place before curfews 
start. And as political hostilities toward media exacerbate, it is easy to 
imagine curfew and equipment exemptions becoming less commonplace.  
Absent recognition of a controlling Press Clause right, how might a 
court treat a challenge to an exemption-less ordinance? Some press 
advocates maintain that such ordinances violate the First Amendment as a 
presumptively unconstitutional prior restraint,166 or as an impermissible 
time, place, and manner restriction on newsgathering.167 Under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, time, place, and manner 
restrictions must: (1) be content neutral; (2) be narrowly tailored; and (3) 
leave open ample alternative channels for expression.168 Advocates contend 
that an exemption-less ordinance is not narrowly tailored because the 
governmental interest implicated is public safety, and members of the media 
do not constitute threats of violence or property destruction.169 They further 
argue that exemption-less ordinances do not leave open ample alternative 
channels for expression, as no one is legally permitted to engage in speech 
or newsgathering related to late night assemblies.170 Should either argument 
prevail in court, orders without exemptions would be unconstitutional as 
applied to journalists. There would be no need to resort to a Press Clause 
right to cover protests. 
 
journalists-arrested-during-george-floyd-protests/ [https://perma.cc/2KFD-YNJ7]. 
165.  See Sasha Peters & Linda Moon, Curfew Orders Without Media Exemptions May Be 
Unconstitutional Under First Amendment, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS (June 12, 2020), 
https://www.rcfp.org/curfew-order-special-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/9UP7-TM7X]. 
166.  E-mail to Bill de Blasio and Dermot F. Shea, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS (June 6, 
2020), https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/6-6-20-New-York-Press-Letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D25W-YDFK] (discussing law enforcement targeting journalists during protests). 
167.  Peters & Moon, supra note 172. 
168.  491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
169.  Peters & Moon, supra note172. 
170.  Id. 

















But there are some doctrinal complications. Exempting press from 
curfew orders might render the ordinances no longer content neutral. If so, 
the ordinances would be subject to strict scrutiny.171 Under the Court’s 2015 
decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, “strict scrutiny applies either when a 
law is content based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the 
law are content based.”172 A media-hostile city attorney might argue that 
media exemptions fit within these parameters. For example, one curfew 
order issued by the City of Los Angeles exempted “credentialed media 
representatives engaged in news gathering.”173 Even if the Los Angeles 
order’s exemption is not read as facially discriminatory in favor of certain 
speech topics (news coverage), the law’s purpose and justification are 
seemingly to protect news coverage while not protecting other speech.  
This is not to say that Reed necessarily renders curfew exemptions 
unconstitutional. Applying strict scrutiny to exemption-containing 
ordinances would represent a significant expansion of the content 
discrimination rule, which has long been understood as a safeguard against 
governmental efforts “to suppress unpopular ideas or information or to 
manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”174 
As explained above, a media exemption works in concert with that 
safeguard, not against it. Exemptions help media disseminate information 
and strengthen public debate by amplifying criticisms of government. 
Moreover, post-Reed fears of a doctrine-swallowing content distinction 
have thus far proven unfounded, as lower courts of appeal have mostly 
construed Reed narrowly.175  
Another potential problem is that a legislative press exemption is a 
speaker-based distinction. In Citizens United, the Court held that 
“restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by 
some but not others” are “[p]rohibited.”176 The Court has since hedged on 
this language, recently clarifying that “laws favoring some speakers over 
 
171.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 162 (2015). 
172.  Id. 
173.  Order Setting Curfew During Existence of a Local Emergency, 3 L.A. Admin. Code § 
8.29 (May 31, 2020), https://www.stnc.org/productphotos/Mayor%20Order%20Curfew%2005-31-
20%20REVISED.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R6U-LUZ5]. 
174.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
175.  See Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content 
Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal after Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 191 (2019) (surveying cases).  


















others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference 
reflects a content preference.”177 This approach to speaker-based 
distinctions would simply reincorporate the content discrimination analysis 
above. But a court applying the Citizens United principle rigidly might hold 
that curfew exemptions for journalists discriminate on the basis of speaker, 
disfavoring non-media individuals who wish to disseminate speech about 
curfew-violating gatherings.178 Such a finding would trigger strict 
scrutiny.179 
As with Reed, Citizens United is not an insuperable obstacle for curfew 
exemptions. Scholar Michael McConnell has noted that strictly applying a 
“no speaker-based distinctions” principle to any situation in which some 
speakers are treated differently than others would be “an overreading” of 
Citizens United.180 Media entities are already favored in a broad number of 
contexts not usually considered constitutionally suspect: press passes, shield 
laws, tax policies, postal rates, and broadcasting licenses, among others.181 
And speaker-based distinctions abound in First Amendment jurisprudence 
more generally, like limits on federal employee electioneering and the use 
of communicative channels in schools.182 Curfew exemptions would not 
trigger heightened scrutiny under McConnell’s reading because they 
provide an affirmative benefit to media above and beyond the current 
constitutional baseline.183 He also argues that laws related to newsgathering 
(as opposed to publication) do not trigger speaker-based concerns, which 
would likewise leave curfew exemptions unscathed.184 There is some 
precedent for this distinction. In Branzburg, the Court specifically stated 
 
177.  Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2347 (2020) 
(quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 170).  
178.  See Bezanson, supra note 114, at 1263 (“[L]egislative discrimination (against non-media 
or non-news corporations) would constitute discrimination on the basis of the identity or class of 
speakers and thus be flatly unconstitutional under Citizens United itself—unless the free-press guarantee 
means something different from the speech guarantee, which the Court denies.”).  
179.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. 
180.  McConnell, supra note 2, at 442 n.140. 
181.  West, supra note 40, at 1062. 
182.  McConnell, supra note 2 at 448–49 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of 
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 
(1983)). 
183.  McConnell, supra note 2, at 441 n.4 (“Extension of benefits is not the same, 
constitutionally, as restriction of rights.”). Exemptions from generally applicable regulations are 
typically viewed as benefits to the exemptee, not burdens on the regulated. West, supra note 5, at 122. 
184.  McConnell, supra note 2, at 442 n.140. 

















with regard to newsgathering that state legislatures are “free, within First 
Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions 
and problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement 
officials and press in their own areas.”185 A more media-friendly reading of 
the case law is that preferential press treatment is not constitutionally 
suspect regardless of benefits/burdens or means/ends distinctions.186  
The state of equipment and curfew exemptions absent a Press Clause 
right to cover protests is thus in something of a constitutional limbo. There 
are good arguments that exemption-less ordinances fail under Ward. Neither 
Reed nor Citizens United can be said to definitely control in cases involving 
such exemptions. And, if they do, the exemptions might well satisfy strict 
scrutiny, given the compelling interest in allowing news coverage of 
significant expressive gatherings. But the specter of unconstitutionality 
looms. A ruling striking down exemptions would be within the bounds of 
the frameworks set forth in Reed and Citizens United. The prospect of a 
media-adverse decision thus cannot be discounted, particularly in a media-
adverse climate. An affirmative Press Clause right to cover protests would 
resolve the issue in favor of the media in all jurisdictions, giving coherence 
to the currently unsettled constitutional status of exemptions.187 At the very 
least, the Press Clause should be construed as permitting favorable 
legislative treatment for the press.188  
  
 
185.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 
U.S. 1, 10–11 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
186.  See West, supra note 5, at 123–26. 
187.  See Bezanson, supra note 114, at 1268 (“The obvious—and, indeed, the only possible—
justification for this beneficence is that under the Constitution, the press fulfills a special role in our 
democracy that justifies granting it rights and privileges denied to others.”) (discussing special press 
treatment generally). 


















B. Law Enforcement Directives  
 
1. Discretionary Arrests/Detainments 
 
Most arrests or detainments of journalists are based on vague charges189 
or on failure to obey dispersal orders.190 An affirmative right to cover 
protests would address both. First, it would require heightened factual 
showings of probable cause for nebulous charges. Such heightened 
showings have been previously considered, though ultimately rejected, in 
other First Amendment contexts.191 But the Supreme Court has required 
more exacting standards for police procedure when core First Amendment 
are implicated.192 In Marcus v. Search Warrant, the Court found a 
conclusory affidavit insufficient to justify seizure of allegedly obscene 
publications where police “were  provided  with  no  guide  to  the  exercise 
of informed discretion.”193 A heightened showing would require police to 
state in charging documents, with particularity, conduct beyond 
newsgathering activity justifying any arrest of journalists covering protests. 
Even the Department of Justice has acknowledged the need for judicial 
skepticism in response to such prosecutions of journalists engaged in 
newsgathering: 
[T]he United States is concerned that discretionary charges, 
such as disorderly conduct, loitering, disturbing the peace, 
and resisting arrest, are all too easily used to curtail 
expressive conduct or retaliate against individuals 
exercising their First Amendment rights. The United States 
believes that courts should view such charges skeptically to 
ensure that individuals’ First Amendment rights are 
protected.194 
A heightened showing requirement is particularly prudent in light of the 
 
189.  Peters, supra note 10, at 75–76. 
190.  U.S. PRESS FREEDOM IN CRISIS, supra note 21, at 11. 
191.  See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973) (no heightened probable cause standard for 
securing warrant to seize obscene material). 
192.  See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1961). 
193.  Id. 
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03592-JFM (D. Md. March 4, 2013) (submitted in case of a freelance journalist arrested for disorderly 
conduct while recording police activity at a protest). 

















Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nieves v. Bartlett. The Court held that 
First Amendment retaliation claims cannot be sustained where probable 
cause for an arrest exists, even if the vindication of First Amendment rights 
was a but-for cause of the arrest.195 The decision precludes an important 
means of recourse for journalists whose rights are violated at protests. By 
requiring a more robust showing by arresting officers for the discretionary 
charges most frequently used to arrest journalists covering protests, an 
affirmative Press Clause right would help keep journalists on the street 
reporting instead of in handcuffs. Doing so would also minimize the chilling 
potential of the Nieves decision on vital newsgathering activity by 
subjecting officers who arrest journalists at protests without legitimate 
reason to civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Additional procedural safeguards are likewise necessary for journalists 
who are detained but not arrested, as frequently happens at protests. The 
California legislature’s proposed response to this problem in SB 629 
required that any detained journalist be permitted to immediately contact a 
supervisory officer to challenge the detention.196 Journalists should likewise 
be allowed to exit kettles when caught up in them.197 Even temporary 
detentions can negatively impact vital journalistic functions by keeping 
newsgatherers off the streets and by dissuading other journalists from 
aggressively reporting.  
 
2. Dispersal Orders 
 
A separate but related issue is dispersal orders. Several journalists are 
still facing charges for failure to disperse stemming from the 2020 Black 
Lives Matter protests.198 An affirmative Press Clause right would exempt 
journalists engaged in newsgathering from such orders. Preferential 
treatment of this type would not be without precedent. Special press access 
is regularly granted to, inter alia, government buildings, press 
conferences/pools, executions, crime and disaster scenes, and military 
operations.199  
 
195.  139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019). 
196.  S.B. 629, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). 
197.  See U.S. PRESS FREEDOM IN CRISIS, supra note 21, at 7. 
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Courts, police departments, and state legislatures have recently 
experimented with press exemptions for protest dispersal orders. Judge 
Simon’s preliminary injunction enjoined officers on First Amendment 
grounds from requiring journalists to disperse.200 The City of Oakland 
mandates similar protections as a matter of police department policy. 
Recognizing that “[t]he media has a right to cover demonstrations,” the 
policy states that: 
The media shall be permitted to observe and shall be 
permitted close enough access to the arrestees to record 
their names. Even after a dispersal order has been given, 
clearly identified media shall be permitted to carry out their 
professional duties in any area where arrests are being 
made unless their presence would unduly interfere with the 
enforcement action. 
SB 629 would have enshrined similar protections into California law. It 
required that journalists be allowed to enter any areas at protests closed off 
by police and prohibited officers from interfering with the newsgathering 
and broadcasting activities of journalists in such areas.201 
One hurdle with an exemption from dispersal orders is that journalists 
frequently intermingle with protestors, making it difficult to disperse 
protestors without dispersing the journalists too.202 A possible solution is to 
require journalists not to intermingle, providing protections only for 
journalists who stand off to the side and do not directly embed with 
protestors.203 But even this type of compromise position may not be 
necessary. Experts have testified that it is “workable and feasible” to 
disperse protestors generally but not journalists, and that these practices 
have been implemented and operated successfully by police departments in 
the past.204  
A second hurdle is a concern about interference with law enforcement 
activities if journalists are allowed to remain behind police lines after a 
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dispersal order. But this concern is unfounded. Journalists would still be 
required to comply with all laws, meaning they could not impede, block, 
or interfere with officers with impunity. As in government buildings or at 
crime and disaster scenes, an access right via exemption from a dispersal 





This Article attempts to demonstrate how affirmative constitutional 
newsgathering rights might work in a particular context. The proposed right 
to cover protests shows that the theoretical framework for a revitalized Press 
Clause can be operationalized. While definitional questions may be 
difficult, they are not unanswerable. And while the right in application may 
seem relatively modest, it affords important protections for vital First 
Amendment activity. These protections are more important now than in at 
least a generation, as police and public hostility toward media spikes in 
tandem with levels of protest activity nationwide. If we now find ourselves 
at the precipice of an era of intensifying social unrest, it is critical that we 
take prophylactic steps to gird our democratic institutions. A summer of 
violence and interference painfully reminded us that “when wrongdoing is 
underway, officials have great incentive to blindfold the watchful eyes of 
the Fourth Estate.”205 The Press Clause can help keep those eyes uncovered.  
 
205.  Id. at *1 (quoting Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
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